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Abstract: This article provides a first investigation on the metarules adopted in the
Mīmāṃsā school of textual exegesis. These are not systematically listed and dis-
cussed, but they can be seen at work throughout the history of Mīmāṃsā. The
Mīmāṃsā school has the exegesis of the sacred texts called Veda as its main focus.
Themetarules used to understand the Vedic texts are, however, not derived from the
Veda itself and are rather rational rules which can be derived from the use of
language in general and which Mīmāṃsā authors recognized and analyzed. Since
the metarules are considered to be not derived from the Veda, it is all but natural
that later authors inspired byMīmāṃsā apply them outside the precinct of the Veda,
for instance in the fields of textual linguistics, poetics, theology and jurisprudence.
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The article also suggests to divide Mīmāṃsā metarules into three groups, namely
metarules dealing chiefly with linguistic issues, metarules dealing chiefly with
hermeneutic issues and metarules dealing chiefly with deontic ones. Last, the
Mīmāṃsā metarules bear clear similarities with the ones found in Grammar and
in the Śrautasūtras, but also important differences. The Śrautasūtras rules have
the same primary objects, namely Vedic prescriptions, but are different from the
Mīmāṃsā ones because the latter are more general and systematic and can
generally be applied also outside the Veda.
In the following, I will focus on the referent of paribhāṣā, namely, the concept
of metarule (or general rule, as one will see), in Mīmāṃsā. By contrast, I will not
focus on the term paribhāṣā, which is not very frequent in Mīmāṃsā (I could
locate only two occurrences in the Śābarabhāṣya, see Section 3.2, and none in the
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Mīmāṃsāsūtra) and does not denote metarules (as in the case of the late
Mīmāṃsā Paribhāṣā, which is only an ‘Elucidation on Mīmāṃsā’ and does not
aim at providing the metarules for Mīmāṃsā or of Mīmāṃsā). The term used in
Mīmāṃsā for the function of paribhāṣā is nyāya.1 A more comprehensive investi-
gation on the emergence of the two terms remains a desideratum, but whereas it
is easy to imagine how the meaning of “general rule” could have been smoothly
accommodated within the semantic sphere of nyāya, the semantic development
through which the term paribhāṣā became —at a later point— the standard term
for metarules seems to be the result of an intentional turn (possibly by someone
within the Pāṇinian tradition) in the direction of its technical use.
As will be shown below, a study of the (emergence of) general rules inMīmāṃsā
runs the risk of being a study of Mīmāṃsā tout court, thus, the present paper will
focus on delineating their specific characters, often against the background of their
use in Grammar and Śrautasūtras. The former provides the normative referent for the
usage of paribhāṣās, whereas the latter are the texts historically closer to Mīmāṃsā.
1 What is Mīmāṃsā?
Mīmāṃsā (lit. ‘investigation’2) is one of the six traditionally recognized Indian
philosophical systems (darśana). It was born out of an ancient tradition of
exegesis of Sacred Texts and keeps as its primary focus the Veda3 (‘knowledge’,
Indian sacred texts, not accepted as such by Buddhist and Jaina schools). Thus,
like all other philosophical systems generally look at Vaiśeṣika for natural
philosophy and at Nyāya for logic, so they look at Mīmāṃsā as a reservoir for
exegetic rules, making it possibly the main source for the Indian approach to
hermeneutics in general. This influence is particularly evident in the case of
1 “Some principles of interpretation were concurrent with the ritual literature and practice. The
old name for such principles seems to be nyāya” (Chakrabarti 1980: 6). vyākaraṇe yathā sa ̄kṣāt
mahābhāṣye eva bhūyasyaḥ paribhāṣā ukta ̄ḥ, na tatha ̄ mīmāṃsa ̄yāṃ bhāṣyādiṣu prācīneṣu
bhāṭṭadīpikādiṣu va ̄rvācīneṣu grantheṣu paribhāṣā na ̄ma kācid apy ukta ̄ | nyāyās tu nānāvidhā
uktāḥ | tathāpi bhāṣyādau dṛṣṭāni kānicid va ̄kyāni paribhāṣāvat jñāyamānāni (MK, s.v.).
2 The desiderative formation, later reinterpreted as conveying the wish to reflect, might have
originally rather conveyed the continuous strive to investigate, as common for Vedic desidera-
tives, see Heenen (2006: 70–73).
3 For Mīmāṃsā authors, the main part of the Vedas are the prescriptions contained in the
Brāhmaṇas. The Vedic Saṃhitās are considered to contain mainly mantras to be used during
sacrifices, whereas the mythological parts of the Brāhmaṇas, as well as the Āraṇyakas and the
Upaniṣads are to be understood as delivering mainly arthavādas ‘commendatory statements’, to
be understood as supplements of prescriptions.
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Vedānta schools, where Mīmāṃsā rules (nyāya), adjusted to the Vedānta view of
the Veda or other Sacred Texts, have been systematically applied and constitute
the background of most theological discussions.
The bulk of the system is based (as usual in India) on a collection of sūtra
‘aphorisms’, Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtra (henceforth MS) which would be quite
obscure without Śabara’s Bhāṣya (‘commentary’, henceforth ŚBh). Jaimini’s is
possibly the most ancient philosophical sūtra and it has been convincingly argued
that he was a contemporary of the grammarian Kātyāyana.4 By contrast, there is no
direct evidence about the date of Śabara, who knows some sort of Mahāyāna and
seems to be aware of a theory of sphoṭa (which seems more primitive than
Bhartṛhari’s one5), but does not refer to any known author after Patañjali (ca.
second century BC.). Some centuries later, around the seventh century (sixth
century according to Krasser 2012), Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara Miśra wrote
philosophically engaged commentaries on the ŚBh. These commentaries have been
again commented upon by later Mīmāṃsā authors (Pārthasārathi, e. g. wrote a line-
to-line commentary on Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika and Śālikanātha a similar gloss on
Prabhākara’s Bṛhatī). According to the different tenets of these two main thinkers,
Mīmāṃsā is traditionally distinguished in two schools, the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, which
follows Kumārila, and the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, which follows Prabhākara.
Mīmāṃsā may also be referred to as Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, to distinguish it from Uttara
Mīmāṃsā (or Vedānta). For brevity’s sake, I shall restrict the use of “Mīmāṃsā” to
Pūrva Mīmāṃsā only. A thinker belonging to the Mīmāṃsā school is called
Mīmāṃsaka ‘follower of the Mīmāṃsā’.
The main Mīmāṃsā tenets originated out of issues connected with Vedic
exegesis, with ‘Veda’ referring to first and foremost to the Brāhmaṇa part of the
Veda, which mainly consists of ritual exhortations.
2 In search of an absent definition of paribhāṣā:
Mīmāṃsā and Śrautasūtras
2.1 What is a paribhāṣā?
The meaning of paribhāṣā is —against expectations— not fixed. As for its usage
in the Śrautasūtras, Chakrabarti explains:
4 See Paranjpe 1922, Parpola 1994.
5 Bhartṛhari’s date is itself controversial, but scholars tend to agree on the fifth century AD.
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The term paribhāṣā was not well-defined and it appears that no definition
was strictly adhered to when the sūtras were characterized as paribhāṣā.
Not only the basic interpretative clues, but also the general rules were
regarded as paribhāṣā. They contain some heterogeneous topics, and some
insignificant rules too crept into the paribhāṣās.6
And:
A precise definition of the term ‘paribhāṣā’ was not available to the writers
who characterized some parts of the Śrautasūtras as paribhāṣā. For the
present study, the sūtras that are described as such by commentaries or
colophons are accepted as paribhāṣā.7
As for Grammar, Wujastyk argues that paribhāṣās have been introduced for
solving problems of the Aṣṭādhyāyī and suggests that they might have, accord-
ingly, a different degree of abstraction:
Rather than giving up Pāṇini’s grammar as wrong in such cases, it is
natural to try to improve the theory. The tradition introduces extra rules
to correct the situation. These are the paribhāṣās, a term which may be
translated as ‘metarules’, ‘principles’, ‘theorems’ or ‘auxiliary hypothesis’.8
In Mīmāṃsā, by and large, we might understand the term paribhāṣā (and even
more so its quasi-equivalent in Mīmāṃsā, i. e. nyāya) in two senses: in a loose or
in a technical sense. In the following, I shall deal mainly with the latter, thus a
few words on the former and on their distinction are not out of place here. In the
looser sense, a nyāya is a general rule regarding a certain behavior. In the
stricter sense, it is a rule ruling other rules. Thus, technically speaking a
paribhāṣā is a rule which does not deal with anything specific and rather
deals with the general system of rules outlining its basic principles. paribhāṣās
are, accordingly, useful and economical insofar as they allow authors to avoid
repetitions, but may lead to difficulties if one is focusing on one part only of the
system. In other words: the reader/listener needs to have the whole system in
sight in order to benefit of the use of paribhāṣās.
6 Chakrabarti 1980: vii.
7 Chakrabarti 1980: 5.
8 Wujastyk 1993: xi.
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In the looser sense, paribhāṣās even precede the Śrautasūtras:
Some paribhāṣās of the Śrautasūtras can be traced in the Brāhmaṇas. The
older authors sometimes introduce a paribhāṣā with the expression iti
vijñāyate, thereby showing the existence of the principles before the com-
position of the Śrautasūtras.9
An example of the former kind of nyāya is the Mīmāṃsaka khalekapotavan-nyāya
‘the rule of the pigeons in the threshing floor’. This is only a simile used to represent
cases in which many items at once occur in the same place, just like pigeons
hurrying to grasp some grains. But it does not regard rules. By contrast, rules
such as ‘the meanings of the words in the MS are the same as in the ordinary
communication’ (about which see infra, Section 3.2) apply to other rules, the ones
mentioned in the MS. Although the technical usage of nyāyas derives from the
looser one, it is convenient to distinguish between the two.
2.2 What does the fact of having metarules tell us about
Mīmāṃsā and Śrautasūtras?
In order to be a metarule, a rule needs to refer to further rules. Since the main focus
of the Mīmāṃsā is the Veda, rules regarding it directly do not need to be metarules.
By contrast, in Mīmāṃsā metarules are rules ruling a certain exegetical rule (for
instance, all rules applying to other rules of the Mīmāṃsā system, or all rules
applying to an exegetical rule discussed in the ritualistic thought prior to the MS).
The fact of using metarules is a further evidence of the fact that the purpose
of Mīmāṃsā was not the production of ritual manuals, since, as already hinted
at, metarules are useful if one has the system in view, but impractical if one
focuses on one of its parts. This point could be extended to at least some parts of
the Śrautasūtras, which are not only a ritual manual.10
9 Chakrabarti 1980: 6.
10 Although some portions of the Śrautasūtras focus on the performance of a given ritual, all the
Śrautasūtras I am aware of also contain at least some sūtras, or even whole sections of sūtras which
are dedicated to the understanding of the structure of rituals rather than to their performance.
Metaphorically speaking, the Śrautasūtras may resemble cooking books, but they do not contain
only recipes. A striking example is the karmānta section in the Baudhāyana Śrautasūtra, where also
epistemological questions are dealt with (see Freschi/Pontillo 2013b, chapter 2). An extreme perspec-
tive on this topic is the one expressed by Hillebrandt: “It is clear that the [Śrauta] Sūtras, with their
precise structure could not be enough for practical needs, nor indeed can they have been calculated
for these needs. They are rather just artificial scientific systems, where the prescriptions to be
employed for each ritual act merge uniformly into each other. Hence, in the case of an actual
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Given that Mīmāṃsā and Śrautasūtras resemble each other from this point of view,
the problem of the differences among the use of paribhāṣās in the former and in the
latter amounts to the problem of the different degree of systematic-ness in them. The
Śrautasūtras presuppose in their reader the knowledge of the ritual they are dealing
with. In the case of Mīmāṃsā, the distance from the actual performance is even
bigger. In fact, in a Śrautasūtra the ritual elements tend to be discussed according to
the order of their appearance in the ritual,11 whereas in Mīmāṃsā only the structure
and some chief topics of the ritual are discussed, usually the ones leading to
theoretic problems. In this sense, the Mīmāṃsā presupposes both the knowledge
of the ritual, and of the Śrautasūtra discussions about it.
More in general, the following ones are the main distinctive traits of the
Mīmāṃsā’s prosecution of the Śrautasūtra discourse on paribhāṣās:
1. from a quantitative point of view: the Mīmāṃsā applies in a generalized way
the paribhāṣā method, whereas the paribhāṣās are altogether absent in the
most ancient Śrautasūtras and are still confined to a specific portion of the
text in the most recent ones,
2. from a qualitative point of view: the nyāyas of Mīmāṃsā regard the exegesis
of the Brāhmaṇas, i. e. they regard another text, and not the ritual directly,
whereas the paribhāṣās of the Śrautasūtras regard the ritual itself (this point
will be dealt with again infra, Section 3.3),
3. speaking again from a qualitative point of view: the Mīmāṃsā applies
paribhāṣās even outside the domain of ritual exegesis.
These differences reflect the ones highlighted by Lars Göhler —who has
been studying the way Mīmāṃsā emerged out of the Śrautasūtras’ milieu12—
as the general differences among the former and the latter are13:
performance [of a ritual] one should extensively take into account the commentaries and the
manuals, which translated back the scientific description into praxis” (Es ist klar, dass die Sûtra’s
bei solch präciser Fassung dem praktischen Bedürfniss weder genügen noch überhaupt auf dasselbe
berechnet sein können; vielmehr sind sie lediglich construierte wissenschaftliche Systeme, in wel-
chem die bei den einzelnen Handlungen zur Anwendung kommenden Vorschriften einheitlich
verschmolzen werden. Bei einer praktischen Darstellung war darum auf Commentare und
Leitfäden, welche die wissenschaftliche Darstellung wieder in die Praxis umsetzen, eingehend
Rücksicht zu nehmen, Hillebrandt 1879: XI).
11 “The Śrautasūtras furnish a well-connected and systematized description of the rites in due
sequence from the beginning to the end of a sacrifice. They avoid legends and mystic inter-
pretations, which are the chief interest of the Brāhmaṇas” (Chakrabarti 1980: 2).
12 Göhler further shows how direct links between Vedic and Mīmāṃsā terminology and
epistemology can be traced.
13 Göhler 2011: 122.
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1. In den Śrautasūtras können diskursive Methoden angewendt werden, in der
Mīmāṃsā ist dies zwingend bei jedem Thema der Fall. Es gibt keine größere
Erörterung ohne das Anführen der Auffassung eines Opponenten
(pūrvapakṣa).
2. Alle Erörterungen der Mīmāṃsā stehen im Zusammenhang mit einem
möglichst widerspruchsfreien Gesamtsystem des Opfers und der Theorie
über das Opfer. Die Elemente dieses Gesamtsystems können jederzeit als
Argument für die Entscheidung einer Detailfrage herangezogen werden; dies
ist besonders häufig bei der Klärung der Hierarchien der Fall. In den
Śrautasūtras findet sich zwar gleichfalls ein Gesamtsystem des Opfers,
dieses ist aber schulgebunden. Darüber hinaus entwickeln sie keine
einigermaßen komplexe Theorie über das Ritual, in der Weise, wie es die
Mīmāṃsā tut.
3. Bei der Entscheidung der kontroversen Themen hält sich das Śrautasūtra im
Zweifelsfall eher an die Texte der eigenen Schule, während für die Mīmāṃsā
die allgemeine logische Konsistenz des Rituals eine weit größere Rolle
spielt.
And what is the specificity of the system of Mīmāṃsā? Again, in the words of
Göhler:
Jaimini deutet das gesamte Opfersystem erstmals als eine in sich konsis-
tente Hierarchie. Er beginnt das Thema mit einem Gemeinplatz: Etwas ist
untergeordnet, wenn es einem anderen Zweck dient. Nach einem Bādari
sind dies Substrate, Qualitäten und Vorbereitungszeremonien. Nach
Jaimini jedoch sind dies auch Tätigkeiten. Jaimini geht die übliche
Stufenleiter weiter: All diese Dinge dienen also dem Resultat und das
Resultat dient menschlichen Zwecken. Damit stünde der Mensch am
Ende dieser Hierarchie. Dies ist für Jaimini unbefriedigend, denn der
Mensch ist gleichzeitig der Tätigkeit untergeordnet, weil er sie vollbringt.
Damit gibt es keine eindeutige Kette der Über- und Unterordnungen mehr,
die in einem höchsten Prinzip endet. Die drei Hauptfaktoren des Opfers:
Person, Resultat und Tätigkeit sind sich gegenseitig sowohl unter- als auch
übergeordnet. Kumārila spricht deshalb später von einem Doppelcharakter
dieser Prinzipien. Alle drei sind sowohl grundlegend als auch sekundär.14
This all leads to conclude that the paribhāṣās, though present in the
Śrautasūtras, are less generally used. It might be objected that there are general
14 Göhler 2011: 92.
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metarules also in some Śrautasūtras, such as prasaṅgād apavādo balīyaḥ
(see Chierichetti) (Āśvalāyana Śrautasūtra 1.1.22). However, in general these
metarules are absent in the most ancient Śrautasūtras (such as Baudhāyana
Śrautasūtra15 and Lāṭyāyana Śrautasūtra) and tend to represent a later develop-
ment, possibly influenced by Mīmāṃsā itself, since the later Śrautasūtras
(such as the Kātyāyana Śrautasūtra) have most probably been composed after
the first Mīmāṃsā works. The presence of this later developments within the
Śrautasūtra corpus is evidence of the links between them and the Mīmāṃsā,
although the birth of the latter did not mean the decline of the former, due to
their different focuses. Their relative chronology rather resembles the one
described in Figure 1.
3 Analysis of some paribhāṣās
in the Mīmāṃsāsūtra
Let us now examine the strategies of the Mīmāṃsā paribhāṣās, both in their
specific purpose of organizing the exegesis of rituals and in their extended use.16
The MS starts with what has been later labelled tarkapāda, i. e. a short
chapter dealing with the theoretical matters preliminary to the ritual exegesis.
Figure 1: Chronology of Śrautasūtras and Mīmāṃsā.
15 The karmāntasūtra section in this Śrautasūtra, where paribhāṣās are grouped, though
ancient, constitutes a later development within the Baudhāyana Śrautasūtra.
16 As already hinted at, unlike in the case of Grammar, there is no list of Mīmāṃsā nyāyas, nor
are they univocally identified by commentators. A useful tool is thus Kane’s Appendix to
Section VII Chapter XXX in his History of Dharmaśāstra, and Jha ̄ 2013 where nyāyas relevant
for Pu ̄rva and Uttara Mīmāṃsā are listed. I am grateful to Sudipta Munsi for having pointed
them out to me.
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Thus, the tarkapāda is more likely to include paribhāṣās in the second sense.
And in fact, it contains sūtras such as:
The dharma is a purpose known through a Vedic injunction
(codanālakṣaṇo ’rtho dharmaḥ, MS 1.1.2).
This is a handy definition of the complex term dharma, which is not complete
(in the sense that it does not spell out the complex semantics of dharma),
because it does not aim at completeness. Rather, it aims at being used while
reading the rest of the MS. It says that, within the MS, dharma must be under-
stood in this way (and not in the many other ways, already current at the time
the MS had been authored). In this sense, it can be said to be a paribhāṣā,17
although its language is not distinct from the rest of the text, nor is it identified
as such in any other way. We shall see that this lack of characterization is a
recurring feature of paribhāṣās in Mīmāṃsā and that this is quite telling in itself.
Summing up, this paribhāṣā is a metarule about the MS, although it is not
identified as such. Recurring to the ―more developed― technical terminology
of the Vyākaraṇa school, we might call this kind of sūtras “saṃjñāsūtras”, i. e.
‘sūtras stipulating a conventional meaning’.18
What about later chapters in the MS? MS 1.2 focuses on the difference
between Vedic injunctions and statements in the Veda which are not injunctive
in nature and, thus, are not instruments of knowledge. This definition presup-
poses MS 1.1.2, that states that dharma is conveyed by Vedic injunctions, so that
whatever is not an injunction does not convey dharma and has, accordingly, no
independent epistemological value regarding dharma.19 An example of this
group of sūtras is the following:
Since [commendatory statements and other non-injunctive statements in
the Veda] form a single sentence with the [corresponding] injunction, they
are meant for the purpose of praising the injunctions.
(vidhinā tv ekavākyatvāt stutyarthena vidhīnāṃ syuḥ, MS 1.2.7).
17 In the Pāṇinian terminology, one might more precisely call it a sam ̣jñāsūtra. This terminol-
ogy was not present in Mīmāṃsā, as far as my knowledge reaches.
18 On saṃjñāsūtras as paribhāṣās, see Candotti and Pontillo’s contribution in this volume.
19 Given that Mīmāṃsakas only consider as an instrument of knowledge what conveys a fresh
piece of information, this risks to imply that they have no epistemological value at all, but this
does not need to bother us now. See Kataoka 2003.
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An interesting consequence of the above metarule is the following one:
Sometimes [one encounters] an injunction which is meaningless. Then,
praise should be understood [as its meaning]. The same [applies] to other
[similar sentences] due to their similarity with the first one.
(vidhiś cānarthakaḥ kvacit tasmāt stutiḥ pratīyeta tatsāmānyād itareṣu
tathātvam, MS 1.2.23).
In these cases, the sūtras offer a metarule applying to the exegesis of all Vedic texts:
sentences which are not injunctive are only to be construed together with an injunc-
tion. Conversely, sentences which cannot be understood independently, must not be
considered injunctions. Once again, nothing identifies the sentence as a metarule
and its domain of application is broad (in fact, the exegesis of the whole Veda).
3.1 Which classification for the Mīmāṃsā paribhāṣās?
Chakrabarti, in his foundational work on paribhāṣās in the Śrautasūtras, men-
tions three sorts of paribhāṣās:
Śrautī: The principles given in the Brāhmaṇas, borrowed verbatim or nearly
so, and reduced to the form of paribhāṣās by the authors of Śrautasūtras.
Jñāpitā: The principles implied by the Vedic passages and codified by the
Sūtrakāra in the form of paribhāṣās.
Sautrī: The principles based on convention, reasoning or instances from
worldly practice, or those devised by the authors for helping the particular
method they follow in composing their Śrautasūtras.20
Chakrabarti does not mention any source for this classification,21 which anyway
shares some similarity with the Grammarians’ concept of jñāpaka22. Could this
classification apply to the Mīmāṃsā nyāyas? Probably not, insofar as Mīmāṃsā
authors never overtly state that a certain nyāya derives from a Brāhmaṇa usage,
nor do they mention jñāpaka passages of the Veda as their source. Thus, even if
a Brāhmaṇa prehistory can be safely postulated, it is never a conscious element
20 Chakrabarti 1980: 31.
21 Probably it is his own proposal, since in chapter 4 he writes: “In the first chapter I have
classified the paribhāṣās according to their origin, into 3 categories: Śrautī, Jñāpitā and Sautrī”
(Chakrabarti 1980: 55).
22 I. e. any element of the Aṣṭādhyāyī which hints at a rule or a principle only fully spelt out at
a later time.
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for Mīmāṃsā authors. By contrast, Mīmāṃsā authors explicitly state that their
nyāyas are not derived from the Veda (which includes the Brāhmaṇas), but
rather from the worldly usage of language (lokavyavahāra, VM 1, ad v. 12).
Thus, how else could Mīmāṃsā nyāyas be classified? A first distinction is
between:
1. Rules which are meant as exegetical rules to be applied to the Brāhmaṇas.
2. Rules which prescribe how to interpret the MS (or the ŚBh) itself.
Among the former are:
a) āmnāyasya kriyārthatvād ānarthakyam atadarthānāṃ tasmād anityam
ucyate (MS 1.2.1)
Since the transmitted [Veda] has the purpose of [promoting an] action,
what has not this purpose is meaningless and therefore should be said to
be not [part of the] fixed [Veda].23
b) vidhinā tv ekavākyatvāt stutyarthena vidhīnāṃ syuḥ (MS 1.2.7)
Since they form a single sentence with the prescription, they must be for
the sake of praising the prescriptions.24
c) guṇavādas tu (MS 1.2.10)
But it states something connected.25
d) vidhir vā syād apūrvatvād vādamātraṃ hy anarthakam (MS 1.2.19)
Rather, it should be an injunction, because it [conveys] something new: a
sheer description is in fact meaningless.26
e) lokavad iti cet (MS 1.2.20)
Like in common experience.27
f) na pūrvatvāt (MS 1.2.21)
23 This sentence is an objector’s one, contesting the validity of commendatory statements and
other portions of the Veda which do not enjoin any ritual action. The point of reference of
anityam is not clear, Śabara speaks of “sentence” (vākya). Although this sūtra comes from an
objector, I would nonetheless label it a paribhāṣā because it states a general rule, although one
that will end up being refuted. See infra, Section 3.3 for further thoughts on this point.
24 Here Jaimini offers a paribhāṣā which is alternative to the paribhāṣā proposed by the
opponent in MS 1.2.1, in order to explain the role of commendatory statements.
25 Replying to an objection that says that arthavādas cannot be commendatory statements,
since often what is commended is different than what is enjoined, Jaimini states that the
connection is indirect. In other words, in these cases the commendatory statement, for the
sake of praising X, praises Y, which is connected to X.
26 This sūtra should be read together with MS 1.2.21: the couple conveys the general principle
that each sentence should convey something new and that, if this seems not to be the case, one
is misconstruing it.
27 This principle is a key one in Mīmāmṣa ̄: unless and until contrary evidence arises, one must
use common experience as the litmus test for the validity of one’s conclusions. See also, below,
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This is not the case, because it conveys something already known.
g) uktaṃ tu vākyaśeṣatvam (MS 1.2.22)
By contrast, it has been said that [what does not convey anything new is to
be construed] as a supplement to an injunction.28
h) śrutiliṅgavākyaprakaraṇasthānasamākhyānāṃ samavāye pāradaurbalyam
arthaviprakarṣāt (MS 3.3.14)
If the (epistemological instruments) of direct mention, word-meaning, syn-
tactical connection, context, position, or appellation29 come together, the
latter is always weaker than the former, because it is remoter from the
purpose.
i) arthadravyavirodhe arthaṃ praty ādartavyam (ŚBh ad 6.3.39)
In case of contrast between the substance and the purpose [of a ritual], one
has to honour the purpose.
j) āśraye pravartamāne tadāśritam api pravartate. yathā paṭe ākṛṣyamāne
tadāśritaṃ citram apy ākṛṣyate (ŚBh ad 8.1.23)
Once the substrate undertakes an action, also what rests on it is led to
undertake it. Like, if a cloth is drawn towards oneself, also the colours
resting on it are.
k) akartavyānām itikartavyatayā nāsti sambandhaḥ (ŚBh ad 9.1.1)
There is no connection of the procedure in the case of [acts] which ought
not to be performed.
l) aṅgaguṇavirodhe pradhānaguṇo balavān (ŚBh ad 12.2.25)
In case of contrast between the qualities of [principal] and subsidiary
[rituals], the quality of the principal [ritual] is more important.
m) antaraṅgabahiraṅgayoś cāntaraṅgaṃ balīyaḥ (ŚBh ad 12.2.27)
Between what is intimately related and what is remotely related [to the
sacrificial animal], what is intimately related is stronger (PP).30
It is easy to see how some of the above rules could be applied also outside the
domain of Vedic exegesis (as it has regularly happened, within and outside
ŚBh ad 1.1.1 for its application to language. The sūtra is part of a pūrvapakṣa, but the principle
is not sublated, only its application to a specific case.
28 vākya is used as a synonym of vidhi in the Mīmāṃsā system, since injunctions are the chief
example of meaningful sentences.
29 On these means of knowledge, see Āpadeva’s Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa in Edgerton 1929,
chapters 68–181.
30 The objector wants to establish the principle that in case of conflict between two sets of
sacrificial details, one should perform the ones which are more directly related to the offering
substance. The established conclusion, in the next sūtra, will be that what has been directly
enjoined has precedence. Thus, the explicit mention is stronger than the factual connection.
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Mīmāṃsā). Readers familiar with the Sanskrit Grammatical thought will, for
instance, immediately notice the similarity of the terminology of ŚBh ad 12.2.27
with Patañjali’s treatment of antaraṅga and bahiraṅga.
The latter group, by contrast, is far less numerous. A few instances are:
– loke yeṣv artheṣu prasiddhāni padāni, tāni, sati sambhave, tadarthāny
eva sūtreṣv ity avagantavyam (ŚBh ad 1.1.1)
The words in the MS must be understood, if possible, according to those
meaning which they bear in common experience.
– aṅgāṅgam api tasya iti śakyate vaktum, yathā vājapeyasya yūpaḥ iti (ŚBh
ad 8.1.10)
Also an auxiliary of an auxiliary can be said to be [the auxiliary] of
something, like the post, which [is spoken of as an auxiliary] of the
Vājapeya [although it is actually an auxiliary of the Vājapeya’s auxili-
ary, the Paśu-sacrifice].31
Last, an intermediate category encompasses
3. Rules which could serve both the exegesis of the Brāhmaṇas and that of
the MS
For instance,
– anyāyaś cānekārthatvam (ŚBh ad 1.3.30)
It is incorrect that [a word] has multiple meanings.
– anyāyaś cānekaśabdatvam (MS 1.3.26)
It is incorrect that [a same meaning is expressed by] more than one
linguistic statement.32
One would expect to find rules ruling the understanding of the MS even within
the MS itself, as it happens in the case of the Aṣṭādhyāyī. In fact, an anonymous
reviewer of this article suggested that MS 3.3.14 (discussed above) could be read
as referring (also) to the MS itself. I could not find any indication justifying this
31 This second example entails an instance of metalanguage, since it explains how to interpret
a certain term, which seems to be part of natural language, in a technical way.
32 The word śabda has a broad semantic spectrum, ranging from sound in general (in Nyāya) to
language (in Mīmāṃsā). Within Mīmāṃsā, it can indicate any linguistic unit, from phoneme, to
word, to sentence or text passage. I discussed this topic more in detail in Freschi forthcoming.
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interpretation in the commentaries thereon, so that this hypothesis remains to
be proven.
The Brāhmaṇa-exegetical rules (group 1) are general, overarching rules,
which rule over the content and not the form of other rules, whereas the MS-
structural ones (group 2) are rules ruling the form of other rules. The rules
applying to both (group 3) also regard the form and are hence a subcategory
of the formal rules.
Thus:
1. content-metarules regard the Brāhmaṇas’ exegesis
2. form-metarules regard the MS itself (and sometimes also the Brāhmaṇas)
3.1.1 Guidelines of content-metarules
As for the content-metarules, a general trend in them (see metarules a—c, g—i,
and l—m) is the hierarchical organization of sacrifice (and consequently of
language, see next chapter). This is a tendency which characterizes Mīmāṃsā
throughout its history33 and which has deeply influenced Indian culture.34
The hierarchical organization requires that the sequence is made clear
(see metarule h, above), but also that rules for dealing with potential conflicts
are laid down (see metarules i and k—m above).35
3.2 Paribhāṣās about language
As already noted, Mīmāṃsakas do not focus on ritual, but on texts about ritual.
Consequently, their focus is textual. This also differentiates them from the
Grammarians, whose main focus is language in its phonological/morphological/
syntactic dimensions rather than its textual one. The Mīmāṃsā looks at the Veda
starting from the assumption that the Veda is an instrument of knowledge. This point
is not explicitlymade because it is just the rationale of the existence ofMīmāṃsā. The
next step is the assumption that the Vedic language is understandable, i. e. not only is
theVedavalidknowledge in itself, but it yields validknowledge tohumanbeings. This
step is hinted at in Śabara’s commentary (ŚBh adMS 1.1.1, discussed in the previous
33 See McCrea 2000 and Freschi 2012, chapter 4.1.2.
34 On its influence on Grammar, see Brill 2013: 42, on that on Dharmaśa ̄stra, see Lubin 2013.
35 Brill discusses in this connection the case of recurring to option as discussed in MS 10.8.
adhikaraṇa 3 (see Brill 2013: 44–45 and Benson 2010, ad loc.).
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section),whereŚabara says that thewords in theMSshouldbe interpreted just like the
ones of common language. Śabara does not say explicitly that the same holds true for
the Veda, but the reader is led to assume that unless it is explained that a certainword
has a technical meaning in the Veda, its meaning is the same as in the ordinary
language:
If possible, the words must be understood in the MS according to the
meanings which are well known in the ordinary communication. Their
meaning should not be postulated by means of supplying [additional hues]
nor is it to be explained as a terminus technicus. In this way, the Vedic
sentences are explained through these [sentences of the MS]. If not, the
Vedic sentences should be explained and the own words [of the MS]
should also be explained. Therefore, this would result in a lot of effort.36
Interestingly, the root bhāṣ- with the preverb pari is not frequent in early
Mīmāṃsā and is used here in a meaning different than the stipulative meaning
we agreed upon at the beginning of this volume, i. e. paribhāṣā as ‘metarule’. By
contrast, paribhāṣ- means here ‘to define as a terminus technicus’.37
Once one has accepted the metarule that language has to be understood in
the ordinary way, specific metarules follow, each with a narrower domain of
application, but each still general enough to be applied to the Veda as a whole.
Apart from theMS 1.2 rulesmentioned in the previous section (on the distinction
between injunctive and non-injunctive parts), one may consider the following ones:
– prakaraṇe sambhavann apakarṣo na kalpyeta […] (MS 1.2.24)
If [a text] can be [made sense of] in [its] context, it should not be supposed
that it is drawn away.
– vidhau ca vākyabhedaḥ syāt (MS 1.2.25)
And, in case [also the quality mentioned in a sentence is understood as] an
injunction, there would be a split in the sentence.38
36 loke yeṣv artheṣu prasiddhāni padāni, tāni, sati sambhave, tadarthāny eva sūtreṣv ity ava-
gantavyam | na ̄dhyāhāra ̄dibhir eṣāṃ parikalpanīyo ’rthaḥ, paribhāṣitavyo va ̄ | evaṃ hi vedavā-
kyāny evaibhir vyākhya ̄yante | itarathā vedavākyāni vyākhyeyāni svapadārtha ̄ś ca vyākhyeyāḥ |
tad yatnagauravaṃ prasajyeta |
37 Cfr. the gloss by Kumāra Varadācārya to this passage of the ŚBh within his commentary on
Veṅkaṭana ̄tha’s Mīmāṃsāpādukā: sāṅketikavyavahāraḥ paribhāṣā “A paribhāṣā is a linguistic
usage ruled by convention” (ad MP 13). A similar instance of paribhāṣ- just meaning ‘to explain’
is ŚBh ad 1.4.1.
38 The sūtra deals with cases such as khādiraṃ vīryakāmāya yūpaṃ kuryāt “One should build a
khādira- wood-post, in order to bring about vigour”. If khādira is also understood as having an
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It may, further, be noted that some MS particles could be read as technical terms
(similar to the treatment of vā/vibhāṣā/anyatarasyām in Grammar, about which
see Kiparsky 1979). A preliminary investigation has been done in Clooney (1990),
where it is for instance cleared that vā does not indicate option in the MS (in
fact, it rather marks the siddhāntin’s position).39
Further passages of the ŚBh regard the interpretation of the language of the
MS and could be interpreted as extending to the whole MS (thus reaching the
level of metarules):
– tuśabdāt pakṣo viparivartate (ŚBh ad 1.1.12)
The thesis is turned down because of the word “but”.
– api veti pakṣavyāvṛttiḥ (ŚBh ad 1.3.7)
The thesis is rejected with the word “rather”.
– vāśabdaḥ pakṣaṃ vyāvartayati (ŚBh ad 1.3.9)
The word “rather” rejects the thesis.
However, such indications are repeated again and again by Śabara, thus show-
ing that he does not intend their first enunciation to be enough to cover the
whole MS.
3.3 Is the whole Mīmāṃsā a complex of paribhāṣās?
From a certain point of view, the whole early Mīmāṃsā consists of a complex of
paribhāṣās. Similarly to what happens in Kātyāyana’s vārttikas, we have first
someone proposing one principle of interpretation, next someone else suggesting
a different one, last a siddhāntin. The whole discussion focuses on paribhāṣās and
on arguments in favor or against the one or the other. For instance:
[PP:] If a single ritual were conveyed by all Vedic branches, than the
repetition in another branch of a ritual which has already been prescribed
in a certain branch would be purposeless.
injunctive force (“One should build a post out of kha ̄dira wood”), then one would end up with
the original injunction splitting into two. More in general, the general rule is: unless and until
contrary evidence, each sentence conveys only one piece of information.
39 Clooney 1990: 44–45. Brill suggests further investigation as well on “the significance of
frequently used particles in the Mīmāṃsāsūtra” according to what has been done in Clooney
1990 (2013: 53).
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[paribhāṣā=Vedic injunctions from different Vedic branches about a cer-
tain ritual must be read as conveying a single ritual]
[S:] But this error does not occur in case the [rituals] are different.
Therefore there is difference among the rituals [prescribed by the various
Vedic branches].
[paribhāṣā=Vedic injunctions about a certain ritual from different Vedic
branches must be read as conveying different rituals]40
The presence of discussants shows that different paribhāṣās were upheld by
different experts of ritual (sometimes possibly identifiable with adherents of the
one or the other Śrautasūtra).
Summing up, the Mīmāṃsā could be thought of as a complex of paribhāṣās,
if we understand paribhāṣās as general rules. Metarules are, by contrast, rare. To
this point, however, one should add that the rules about ritual (i. e. the sacrifi-
cial injunctions) are —according to Mīmāṃsakas— given in the Brāhmaṇas. In
this sense, thus, the Mīmāṃsā is a complex system entailing rules about these
operative rules and a few meta-metarules about the functioning of the Mīmāṃsā
system itself. In other words, the Mīmāṃsā system lays down the rule which
make the sacrificial injunctions work, and since the latter are operative rules
about sacrifice, the Mīmāṃsā is the system of metarules about them. In the next
table, I show how the Brāhmaṇas provide the operative rules for sacrifices,
whereas the Mīmāṃsā provides the metarules. This distinction is not present
in the case of language, where all rules are laid down in Grammar.
3.4 Location and origin of the paribhāṣās in Mīmāṃsā
Śabara points out at the beginning of his commentary the way he will interpret
the language in the MS (see above, second paragraph within Section 3.1).
However, in another case, i. e. his comment on MS 8.1.10 (discussed in the
same paragraph), he states a principle which might be potentially applied to
40 yadi sarvaśākhāpratyayam ekaṃ karma, ekasyāṃ śākhāyāṃ vihitasya karmaṇaḥ śākhāntare
vacanaṃ punaruktam anarthakaṃ syāt. na tu bhedapakṣa eṣa doṣo ’sti, tasma ̄d api
karmabhedaḥ (ŚBh ad MS 2.4.8).
Field language sacrifice
operative rules provided by Grammar Brāhmaṇas
metarules provided by Grammar Mīmāṃsā
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all injunctions. There is thus no preferred place for stating more general rules.
However, some of Jaimini’s sūtras work as adhikaraṇa-sūtras, influencing the
subsequent ones and some parts of them descend per anuvṛtti to the subsequent
sūtras.
How are the paribhāṣās grounded? They are worldly and not Vedic, just like
the whole Mīmāṃsā is not of Vedic origin, although it deals with Vedic texts.
Further, a posteriori, one may note that:
1. a basic general principle is economy (of tools and of actions): whenever
more options are possible, one opts for the more economical one,
2. a basic general exegetical rule is that each sentence must be interpreted as
conveying one single meaning,
3. the comparison with the world, which is either expressed as a general
principle (see MS 1.2.20 and 1.2.29 below) or in the form of specific
instances, functioning as an explanation for further, unpredictable, rules,
4. the Veda’s validity is inviolable and thus provides a further orientation for
decisions concerning its exegesis.
As for 1., it includes the logical consistency of the Mīmāṃsā Śāstra itself, so that
if, for instance, agnihotra needs to be construed as the name of a sacrifice (and
not as a generic description of an ‘oblation for Agni’) in a certain occasion, the
same meaning needs to be accepted in all other cases (cf. MS 1.4, adhikaraṇa 4;
MNP41). This is also the reason whence, once a conclusion has been settled in a
certain case (e. g. that Vaiśvadeva is not the name of a specific sacrifice, see MS
1.4, adhikaraṇa 11), the same conclusion can serve as a ruling principle for all
similar instances (the vaiśvadevanyāya). Similarly, economic reasons lead to the
conclusion that whenever a plural ending is used and no specific number is
mentioned (e. g. in “One should offer kapiñjala birds for the spring”), one needs
to assume the lowest possible number, i. e. three (MS 11.1, adhikaraṇa 8).
2. is the oddest principle, from our contemporary point of view, and it in fact
does lead Mīmāṃsā authors to problems whenever prescriptions seemingly
prescribe two things, e. g. the performance of a given sacrifice and its tools.
However, one can only imagine how important such a rule must have been in
order to extract from the uninterrupted recitation of the Saṃhitās and of the
Brāhmaṇas the ritual prescriptions and the mantras which should accompany
them.
As for 3., often enough a general rule is explained through a comparison
with worldly experience (cf. the similar usage of Patañjali, see Section 4.3), e. g.
41 Edgerton 1929, §§ 273–301.
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– lokavad iti cet (MS 1.2.20) (discussed above, Section 3.1).
– arthas tu vidhiśeṣatvād yathā loke (MS 1.2.29)
But [commendatory statements] have a meaning, because they are supple-
mentary to the injunction, like in worldly experience.42
The comparison with the world would not be a sufficient foundation unless
one bears in mind also 1., i. e. the idea that unless and until contrary evidences
arise, there is no need to postulate a more cumbersome solution. Thus, if
something is observed to happen in the world, unless contrary evidences,
there is no need to postulate a different behavior in the case of the Veda.
This is perhaps even more evident in the case of local comparisons, e. g.
khalekapotavat (see Section 2.1).
The other foundation is the validity of the Veda, which could be further split
into the idea that, since the Veda is an instrument of knowledge it must (a) be
able to communicate knowledge (and, thus, be understandable, see above,
Section 3.2), (b) communicate something new,43 (c) not communicate anything
invalid, so that if it seems to do so, an alternative explanation must be looked for.
In this study, I will not investigate in detail how these foundations are
followed in the MS itself. It is nonetheless certain that they have their origin
in the MS itself and have not been newly introduced by Śabara and his sub-
commentators.
Is there any hierarchy between these foundations? My study of Mīmāṃsā
inclines me to say that loka and Veda are two completely separated domains, with
their own instruments of knowledge.44 Economy, consistency and compliance
with some basic exegetical rules seem, in turn, to have a general value —unless
and until they clash with common experience (loka) or with the Vedaʼs validity, so
that the virtuous circle of mutual dependence among the principles is closed.
Concerning the relations between Mīmāṃsā and Grammar, one might sug-
gest that No. 1 bears some similarity with the nyāyasiddha paribhāṣā ‘metarules
established through reasoning’ discussed in Vyākaraṇa, whereas No. 3 bears
some similarity with the lokanyāyasiddha paribhāṣā ‘metarules established
through worldly rules’.
42 Śabara explains that even in common experience we might say things which are, on a closer
analysis, inaccurate, but which make sense in their context, e. g. “Devadatta is the strongest”,
although he is not stronger than a tiger.
43 See Kataoka 2003 on this requirement. See again Kataoka 2003 and Freschi/Graheli 2005.
44 However, in his commentary on MS 1.1.32, Śabara resorts to our experience of Vedic sentences
in order to establish the fact that they are well-formed and are, thus, not the work of a mentally
insane author: viniyuktaṃ hi [vedaṃ] dṛśyate, paraspareṇa saṃbandhārtham | [ … ] katham
unmattabālavākyasadṛśam iti vakṣyāmaḥ |. Additions in square brackets are mine.
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4 Paribhāṣās in Mīmāṃsā, Śrautasūtra
and Grammar
4.1 Paribhāṣās in Śrautasūtra and Mīmāṃsā
Unlike in the Śrautasūtras, the paribhāṣās as general rules regarding the ritual
are almost absent in Mīmāṃsā. Rather, they regard the Brāhmaṇa texts and not
the rituals prescribed in such texts. Accordingly, the paribhāṣās in the earliest
Śrautasūtras are found scattered in the sections about the various rituals, and in
the later Śrautasūtras they are found in separate sections. By contrast, the
nyāyas in the MS are organized according to the systematic plan of the MS,
with six books dedicated to the archetype rituals and six to the ectype rituals
and so on. Chakrabarti (1980) discusses in this connection the example of rules
about analogical extension (atideśa) and centralized application (tantra), which
are found all in the same section in the MS, whereas they are distributed in
various sections in the various Śrautasūtras.45
Moreover, already in Jaimini some rules might be applied also to the MS
itself. For instance, na, pūrvatvāt (MS 1.2.21) “No, because it has been already
known” could refer not only to the need for Vedic prescriptions to convey
something new, but also to the need to interpret the MS itself in the same
way, i. e. each sūtra must convey something not known before.
What is then the difference between such principles and the proper meta-
rules (for instance the metalinguistic ones found in Grammar)? That the latter
only work within the system, whereas Jaimini’s metarules are general rules
which are so general, that they can also be applied to the text enunciating them.
4.2 Paribhāṣās in Grammar and Mīmāṃsā
What about the paribhāṣās in Grammar? The question is legitimate not only because
of the importance of paribhāṣās in Grammar, but also because of the relevance of the
connection between Mīmāṃsā and Grammar in their early history.46
An obvious difference between the Grammatical paribhāṣās and the
Mīmāṃsā nyāyas is that the former have been more formalized throughout the
45 Chakrabarti 1980: 108. The entire chapter 6.4 in Chakrabarti 1980 is dedicated to the
chronological relation between MS and the Śrautasūtras and contains several insights derived
from their comparison.
46 About which, see, e. g. Deshpande 1991, Freschi/Pontillo 2013a, Freschi/Pontillo 2013b.
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history of Grammar. Moreover, the Grammatical paribhāṣās regard the exegesis
of a highly technical text, namely Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī and can be convincingly
argued to be present within the text itself, whereas this is not the case for
Mīmāṃsā, which is a technical exegesis of non-technical texts, the
Brāhmaṇas. An illuminating example, in this regard, is the parallel of the
lamp used by both Śabara and Patañjali (see Candotti-Pontillo, this volume,
section 2.2) which, in the former, refers to sacrificial prescriptions and in the
latter to grammatical rules.
However, there are also some basic similarities, especially if one focuses on
the earliest stages of the grammatical use of paribhāṣās. The technical term
paribhāṣā is not found in Pāṇini and is only used twice by Kātyāyana (see
Candotti-Pontillo, fn. 2). It is only Patañjali that codifies the term47 and uses it
consistently while solving seeming inconsistencies in the Aṣṭādhyāyī.48
Furthermore, commentators agree on the link between what later Pāṇinīyas
called paribhāṣā and what is known as nyāya in Mīmāṃsā.49 Last, also in
Grammar, paribhāṣās are not necessarily identified by specific marks (be it the
usage of a technical sigla or their position in the text).
Do these similarities lead to the conclusion that Grammar, Śrautasūtra and
Mīmāṃsā share a common prehistory or is the one indebted to the other?
Dominik Wujastyk, in the Introduction to his edition of Vyāḍi’s Paribhāṣāvṛtti,
implicitly suggests a common prehistory, with possibly the Mīmāṃsā preceding
Grammar in the usage of paribhāṣās,50 whereas Sharon Ben-Dor, quoting
Vashishtha Jhā, suggests that the direction of borrowing is Mīmāṃsā →
Grammar.
Actually, the Pūrvamīmāṃsā can be viewed as the discipline that estab-
lished this method. According to Jha, this discipline is a system that deals
with principles (nyāyas) of textual interpretation for texts whose authors
47 paribhāṣā punar ekadeśasthā satī kṛtsnaṃ śāstram abhijvalayati pradīpavat; tad yathā
pradīpaḥ suprajvalita ekadeśasthaḥ sarvaṃ veśmābhijvalayati, M on A 2.1.1 (see also Candotti-
Pontillo, this volume). Candotti and Pontillo (¶) pointed out that Patañjali seems here to imitate
the Nirukta-style and to make sense of paribhāṣā through a semantic analysis: a paribhāṣā is
accordingly something that shines (bhās-, abhijvalati) all around (pari, sarvaṃ veśma).
48 For his procedure, see Wujastyk 1993: xii.
49 Ben-Dor 2009: 7. A longer discussion on the terms paribhāṣā and nyāya is found in
Chakrabarti (1980: 25–28).
50 “It is a moot point whether or not Pāṇini actually had some of these paribhāṣās in mind as
he composed his grammar; probably he did have at least some of them in mind, whether
explicitly or not. A study of the earliest Mīmāṃsā from this point of view might throw some light
on this question” (Wujastyk 1993: xii).
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were no longer present. He adds that these principles were used by all
the Indian philosophical systems, and argues that all the systems are
indebted to Pūrvamīmāṃsā because it has provided the tools to inter-
pret a text (Jha 1992: 2). […] In respect to Kātyāyana, some scholars
have indicated the close relationship between the vārttikas in the
Mahābhāṣya and the Mīmāṃsāsūtra of Jaimini, and it is likely that
some of the interpretive principles mentioned by Kātyāyana are adopted
from this discipline. […] [W]hat is evident is that already in the time of
Kātyāyana, this method of referring to daily life activities for interpret-
ing a text was an established and accepted practice among Indian
scholars.51
This last element does, in fact, incline one to think that it might have been
possible for Mīmāṃsā to influence Grammar rather than the other way round.
For it is Mīmāṃsakas who trust ordinary experience, whereas Pāṇini tends to
build a consistent system which only refers to ordinary linguistic use and it is
not clear what would be the epistemological foundation of the fact that other
ordinary usages could bear any influence on the Aṣṭādhyāyī (more on this
topic below, Section 4.4). All the authors mentioned here leave the
Śrautasūtras out of the picture and in fact the Śrautasūtras seem to lack
the reference to ordinary experience as source for general rules. Thus, once
one has noticed the similarity in this approach to ordinary experience in
Mīmāṃsā and Vyākaraṇa one is left with a question concerning the direction
of influence or with the hypothesis of a shared prehistory, which, however,
cannot be traced back to the Śrautasūtras.52
On a different perspective, Ben-Dor does not take into account the distinc-
tion between the paribhāṣās as present in the Śrautasūtras and in Mīmāṃsā
(about which see above, Section 2.1).
This distinction is the reason why the metarules developed in Mīmāṃsā
have been adopted outside Mīmāṃsā, whereas the metarules developed within
the Śrautasūtras have not. The latter were, in fact, not systematic enough, and
furthermore they only regarded a given text. Similarly, most metarules of
Grammar have been adopted by later Pāṇinīyas, but have not been extended
(as far as my knowledge reaches) to other fields.
51 Ben-Dor 2009: 8–9.
52 Unlike in the case of other elements of a shared prehistory, such as the principles of rule-
extension, see Freschi/Pontillo 2013a and 2013b.
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4.3 Closed and open systems of paribhāṣās
To summarize in an oversimplifying way (further details are, given after the
table):
With “closed system” I mean the fact that the paribhāṣās found in the
Śrautasūtras do not seem to aim at shedding light on domains outside the ritual
one, that they tend to focus on one ritual at a time, and that they often seem to
focus only on a specific version of the ritual (on the more ecumenic tendency of
the Mīmāṃsā, which often compares the ritual habits of different Vedic
branches).53 This does not deny that many paribhāṣās were shared, as shown
in Chakrabarti 1980. Nor does it deny the fact that rules set down in the context
of one ritual were then applied also to other contexts (e. g. Kātyāyana
Śrautasūtra 1.2.8 on the fact that only Brahmins can officiate). But the fact that
they are repeated in the various Śrautasūtras exactly points at the idea that each
text had to settle the ground for its school’s approach to rituals and that it could
not count on the other texts’ results. Accordingly, a Śrautasūtra states for the
most part rules regarding a (certain version of a) determinate ritual (e. g. antarā
sāmidhenīṣv anūcyam (Āpastamba Śrautasūtra 24.1.11) “One should recite during
the Sāmidhenīs with a tone of voice which is intermediate [between low (man-
dra) and sharp (kruṣṭa)]”) or, in a few cases, the Śrautasūtra itself (e. g.
prasaṅgād apavādo balīyaḥ (Āśvalāyana Śrautasūtra 1.1.22; see Chierichetti)
“An exception is stronger than a general rule”). Similarly, relatively infrequent
(or late) are statements regarding the ritual in general (e. g. phalayuktāni
karmāṇi (Kātyāyana Śrautasūtra 1.1.2) “The ritual acts are connected with a
result”), whereas I could never detect the ambition of stating a general rule,
applicable also to other fields. This is not necessarily the case for Mīmāṃsā,
partly because of its longer history, which made it interact with other schools —
most of all with Vedānta and Dharmaśāstra— and provide them exactly with a
set of exegetical rules (which might have had originally a more limited scope).
Śrautasūtra Mīmāṃsā Grammar
p. applied within the
same text
p. applied also to other texts or:
to all possible texts
development of a technical
language
closed system open system closed system
53 See Göhler 2011: 27.
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Let me clarify with an example, that of two similar sūtras coming from a
Śrautasūtra and from the MS:
teṣāṃ vākyaṃ nirākaṅkṣam (Kātyāyana Śrautasūtra 1.3.2)
Of them [Yajus words] one sentence is one which does not expect
[anything else].
arthaikatvād ekaṃ vākyaṃ sākāṅkṣaṃ ced vibhāge syāt (MS 2.1.46)
[Within a Vedic text,] a single sentence is that which would expect [further
linguistic elements] if they were separated [from it], since they have a
single meaning.
The commonalities are striking, since the author of the MS probably elaborates
on a common lore, making a general statement from a particular one. How
general? Lars Göhler suggests that the MS definition applies to sentences in
general.54 Kumārila in his commentary on MS 2.1.46 explicitly restricts the
definition to Vedic sentences only. Śabara does not address directly the topic,
but he starts by mentioning examples of Yajus sentences and then moves to
sentences in general. The immediate context of the MS seems to suggest that
Jaimini had in view all Vedic sentences. Furthermore, Jaimini adds a motivation
for his claim, thus making it available for further discussions on sentences in
general within the śāstric milieu.55
As for Grammar, the situation is, in fact, further complicated by the fact that
within Grammar, one encounters two types of paribhāṣās, that is, (a) some of them
coming from a worldly background (hinted at with the label laukika by Patañjali)
and (b) the metalinguistic metarules regarding the technical meaning of the case-
endings, etc., within the Aṣṭādhyāyī. The first type suggests perhaps that there
might have been a common reservoir of such rules, and that it might be applied in
an “open system” way, even outside Grammar, as shown by Patañjali’s examples
of worldly applications of them. Moreover, the very fact that Patañjali justifies
some of them linking them to worldly usages suggests that some of them have a
54 Göhler convincingly argues that the sūtra cannot be read as referring only to Yajus verses
since Jaimini uses the technical term va ̄kya also in other contexts in the MS (Göhler 2011: 77).
55 On this topic, it is worth quoting Chakrabarti’s discussion of the difference between the paribhāṣās
in the MS and in the Śrautasūtras: “The descriptive portions of the Śrautasūtras generally enjoin the
ritual practices without mentioning reasons for adopting them. In some paribhāṣā sūtras we notice a
tendency to add the reasons behind them. This tendency is absent in the older Śrautasūtras, but
prominent in the Kātyāyana Śrauta Sūtra. Jaimini shows this tendency to a much greater extent and
frequently uses the ablatives of abstract nouns for stating reasons” (Chakrabarti 1980: 109).
I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer of this volume for making me reconsider MS 2.1.46.
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general validity. By contrast, it is only in the Aṣṭādhyāyī that the locative is used to
indicate the preceding item, which shows that some metarules are only valid
within Grammar.
A further distinction lies in the precise meaning of paribhāṣā as metarule in
Grammar. As already hinted at (in Section 2.1), Mīmāṃsaka nyāyas may be not
metarules, but just rules.
It remains to be settled whether Mīmāṃsā authors consciously pushed the
process of generalization of the rules up to the point of having rules valid for all
sorts of texts independent of an author (or: whose author could no longer be
consulted).
This issue is connected with the way Mīmāṃsakas understood their
nyāyas. Are they just arbitrary rules, such as Pāṇini’s formalization about the
meaning of the locative in the Aṣṭādhyāyī? Or do they tell us something
which is necessarily true about each text? I could not find any explicit answer
in Mīmāṃsā texts. However, if one holds in mind the intrinsic validity theory
(svataḥ prāmāṇya),56 one might suggest that Mīmāṃsā authors generally
trust ordinary experience. If something works in ordinary experience,
unless and until contrary evidence, this is likely to work also in the Veda
(see also Śabara’s similar claim regarding the meaning of words in the Veda,
Section 3.2). After all, if we were to deny this possibility to access the Veda,
this would remain forever precluded to us.
4.4 Influence of Mīmāṃsā
How far does the influence of Mīmāṃsā for the topic of paribhāṣās exactly reach?
On the one hand, the Mīmāṃsā might have furnished other schools with specific
paribhāṣās57 and with the general assumption that common experience can be a
source of knowledge about the textual world, too (see Section 3.4, concerning the
role of common experience as a source for Mīmāṃsā rules, and Section 4.3).
Furthermore, specific exegetical paribhāṣās applied to the Veda by
Mīmāṃsakas have been borrowed and adapted by other schools (see, e. g. Sarkar
1909 for their application to Indian jurisprudence). On the other hand, many
56 According to this theory, one’s cognitions are valid unless and until contrary evidence
arises. A fuller analysis of the theory and of its philosophical significance is found in Taber
1992, whereas Kataoka 2011 dedicates a chapter to the analysis of the theory in Kumārila (Taber
takes into account also his commentators) with a more historical-philological focus.
57 Brill suggests, for instance, that the grammatical uttarottaram principle derives from MS
3.3.14 (2013: 42).
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paribhāṣās are already present in the Śrautasūtras,58 while the Grammarians have
developed many independent ones.
A specific point regards the origin of the idea of using common experience as
the explanation or justification of some rules. The link to common experience is
constitutive of Mīmāṃsā throughout its history (from Jaimini, see Section 3.4, to
Kumārila’s well-known claim —in ŚV codanā 98d–99ab— that “We Mīmāṃsakas
do not admit anything over what is commonly experienced” and in general to the
Mīmāṃsā svataḥ prāmāṇya theory). By contrast, the resort to common experience
seems less essential to Vyākaraṇa,59 so that one might advance the hypothesis
that its presence in the case of the paribhāṣās is due to a Mīmāṃsā or proto-
Mīmāṃsā influence. This theory is however still in need of verification.
5 Conclusions
The term paribhāṣā is not present in the early Mīmāṃsā literature. The whole
Mīmāṃsā could be considered as a system of paribhāṣās, or metarules to be
used either to make sense of the Brāhmaṇa texts or of the preceding ritualistic
tradition. Accordingly, metarules are not explicitly indicated.
Śabara pushes the process further, insofar as he makes explicit some of the
presuppositions implicit in Jaimini (i. e. regarding the meaning of the words in
the MS) and may be credited with creating metarules which directly apply to the
Mīmāṃsā system itself.
The main difference with the paribhāṣās of the Śrautasūtras is the fact that
the latter seem to focus on a narrower context, that of a specific Śrautasūtra,
whereas the Mīmāṃsā ones aim at constructing a system of ritual exegesis
which is internally consistent. They are, hence, not merely practical devices
relying only on the form of rules (such as the succession of rules in Pāṇini,
which has often the only purpose of economy). Rather, they seem to aim at
reflecting the inner consistency of Vedic texts and of the sacrificial system.
58 An obvious example is ādipradiṣṭā mantrā bhavanti (Bharadvāja Śrautasūtra 1.1.21) “The
mantras are indicated through their beginning” (see Pellegrini, Editor’s Overview).
59 Although this procedure is shared by Patañjali, it might be said to be in contrast with the
highly formalized language of the Aṣṭādhyāyī. On this point, consider the following remark:
“This leads us to a crucial point concerning the view that a principle known from daily life
should not be stated; if this view is taken radically, some of Pān ̣ini’s sūtras or parts of sūtras
(e. g. A 1.1.21) may be considered useless because the matters for which they are stated can be
known from daily life activities” (Ben-Dor 2009: 14).
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